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 2 
“There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.” 
Sherlock Holmes in The Boscombe Valley Mystery, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Theories of big have advocated the proposition that “bigger is better” since 
the mid-nineteenth century, drawing especially on notions of economies of 
scale and scope (Stigler, 1960; Silberston, 1972 Chandler, 1990), natural 
monopoly (Mill, 1848; Mosca, 2008), or preemptive capacity building (Porter, 
1980). Building big has traditionally been seen as necessary to secure efficient 
economies of scale and to lock competitors out of future rivalry (Ghemawat, 
1991; Ghemawat & der Sol, 1998; Hayes & Garvin, 1982, p. 78; Penrose, 1959, 
2009, pp. 89-92; Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). Economies of scale in the 
production of electricity, for example, assume declining average cost curve as 
output expands (Ansar & Pohlers, 2014: Figure 1). 
  
Theories of big have held an enduring sway on management practice. Scaling 
is deemed necessary for survival and competitive advantage in many 
industries such as steel (Crompton & Lesourd, 2008), shipping (Cullinane & 
Khanna, 2000), banking (Cavallo & Rossi, 2001), telecommunications 
(Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998; Foreman & Beauvais, 1999), water, and 
electricity utilities (Kowka, 2002; Pollitt & Steer, 2011). Big ventures are 
witnessed when companies try to pursue new product or geographic markets: 
Motorola spent US$ 6 billion in technological rollout of its Iridium satellite 
constellation (Bhidé, 2000); the German steel company ThyssenKrupp spent 
over US$ 11 billion to enter the US and Brazilian markets (Ansar, 2012). In the 
context of economic development, Sachs (2006) has popularized the view that 
big challenges—such as poverty alleviation, energy and water scarcity, or 
urbanization can only be solved with “big push” solutions.  
 
Theories of big are not universally accepted, needless to say. Schumacher 
(1973) championed, “Small is beautiful.” Easterly (2002, 2006) has argued 
against the big push “mega-reforms” that Sachs favors. Perhaps the most 
persistent attack on theories of big has come from Lindblom who advanced 
the notions of “muddling through” (1959) and “disjointed incrementalism” 
(1979) as an alternative to “bigger is better.” In the academic debate, a school 
of thought emerged around the notion of incrementalism, with concepts such 
as logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1978); modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000); 
real optionality (Copeland & Tufano, 2004); adaptive change (Heifetz et al., 
2009). The key rationale for incrementalism is based on the well-documented 
limits of rationality in decision making under uncertainty (Atkinson, 2011, p. 
9). 
 
Yet theories of big have maintained an enduring upper hand in mainstream 
business and government practice: megaprojects, justified on the bases of 
theories of big, are more ubiquitous and bigger than ever (Flyvbjerg, 2014). A 
renewed enquiry into the validity of theories of big has become urgent 
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because big capital investment decisions routinely fail in the real world. 
Motorola’s Iridium went bankrupt within three years of its launch wiping 
nearly US$10 billion of equity (Kerzner, 2009: 351). ThyssenKrupp’s 
megaprojects in Americas initiated in 2005 suffered a worse fate. By June 2012 
ThyssenKrupp’s survival was in doubt and the company’s share price was a 
quarter of its May 2008 high. The company was forced to raise fresh capital in 
part by selling its ill-fated US steel plant at a steep discount to its archrivals 
ArcelorMittal and Nippon-Sumitomo. ThyssenKrupp’s top management team, 
including the Chairman Gerhard Cromme, who initiated the big capital 
investments, was fired. Other cases of big bets gone awry abound. Losses 
from Boston’s Big Dig or Citigroup’s “bold bets” reach into the billions of 
dollars (Dash & Creswell, 2008). Not only did the costs sunk into Japan's 
Fukushima nuclear power plant become unrecoverable; its cleanup costs 
rippled far into the economy. Beyond the financial calculus, even the reticent 
Chinese government is opening up to the profound and unforeseen human 
and environmental impacts of China's Three Gorges dam (Qiu, 2011; Stone, 
2008, 2011). 
 
Over the last fifteen years evidence from large datasets has mounted that the 
financial, social and environmental performance of big capital investments, in 
the public and private sectors alike, is strikingly poor (see, for example, Nutt, 
1999, 2002; Flyvbjerg et al, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2009; Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004; 
Flyvbjerg & Budzier, 2011; Van Oorschot et al., 2013; Ansar et al., 2014).  
 
In this chapter we characterise the propensity of big capital investments to 
systematically deliver poor outcomes as “fragility” a notion suggested by 
Taleb (2012). A thing or system that is easily harmed by randomness is fragile. 
We argue that, contrary to their appearance, big capital investments break 
easily—i.e. deliver negative net present value—due to various sources of 
uncertainty that impact them during their long gestation, implementation, 
and operation. We do not refute the existence of economies of scale and scope. 
Instead we argue that big capital investments have a disproportionate (non-
linear) exposure to uncertainties that deliver poor or negative returns above 
and beyond their economies of scale and scope. We further argue that to 
succeed, leaders of capital projects need to carefully consider where scaling 
pays off and where it does not. To automatically assume that "bigger is 
better," which is common in megaproject management, is a recipe for failure. 
 
Below, first we develop and draw linkages between three theoretical 
concepts: Big, Fragility, and Scale versus Scalability. Building on the relevant 
literature, we advance twelve propositions about the sources and 
consequences of fragility, which we then apply to big capital investments. 
Specifically, we develop the construct of “investment fragility”—the 
threshold at which the cumulative losses from an investment exceeds the 
investment’s cumulative gains. Second, we substantiate our propositions 
about the fragility of big capital investments using evidence from a dataset of 
245 big dams. Our theoretical propositions and evidence from big dams 
suggests that big capital investments fail to achieve the aspirations of 
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scalability and efficiency set for them at the outset. Once broken, these 
investments become stranded causing long-term harm to the companies and 
countries that undertake them.  
 
THEORY AND CONSTRUCTS 
What Is Big? 
Whether something is big seems obvious enough. Yet the construct of big and 
the related ideas of large, large-scale, major, mega, or huge etc. prove 
deceptively elusive when subjected to scrutiny. A literature review of 
definitions of big and related words reveals a non-exhaustive list of multiple 
dimensions of the construct of big such as: 
• Physical proportions measured in height, length, mass, weight, area, 
or volume;  
• Inputs required to build and run the thing measured in terms of 
quantities (and quality) of land, labor, or equipment required;  
• Financial outlay measured in upfront capital expenditure (Flyvbjerg, 
2014), recurrent operational expenditure, or end-of-life costs (Clark & 
Wrigley, 1995, 1997); 
• Supply measured in the units of output that the thing can produce 
(Samuelson, 1948; Stigler, 1958) or the multiplicity of outputs 
(Chandler, 1990); 
• Demand being served measured not only in terms of units of demand 
but also the quality, speed, and functionality (Weinstock & 
Goodenough, 2006);  
• Temporality measured in time it takes to build the thing or the length 
of its life span (Gomez-Ibanez, 2003); 
• Spatial fixity or immobility and the cost of moving an asset—big tends 
to “spatial fixity” (Ansar, 2012); 
• Complexity measured, for example, with a focus on the technical 
aspects of the asset or its delivery (Simon, 1962); or with a focus on the 
social and political complexity (Liu et al., 2007); 
• Impact measured in number of people who might benefit or be 
harmed; number of functions enabled or disabled; or the magnitude 
and pace of change the thing can cause in its environment. 
 
The relationships among these multiple dimensions—and even the indicators 
within each dimension—are seldom straightforward. For instance, it is often 
taken for granted that in order to reduce the amount of time required to 
complete a venture, e.g. a software IT project, a manager would need to 
mobilize more programmers, which will also increase the capital expenditure 
of the venture (for a discussion see Atkinson, 1999; Williams, 2005).  
 
Bigness entails multiple and unpredictable interactions across the dimensions 
we have listed with which theories of big—such as the notion of economies of 
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scale—have not meaningfully engaged. The risk of big is reflected in these 
interactions, which we turn to now.  
 
What Is Fragility? 
Taleb (2012) proposes the construct of fragility, and its antonym antifragile, to 
capture the type of randomness and risk we talk about here. Taleb’s 
inspiration for the concept came from his observation that there is no random 
event that can benefit a porcelain cup resting on a table yet a wide range of 
uncertain events – such as earthquakes or human clumsiness – that can pose 
harm (Taleb 2012, p. 268). Fragile things, like the porcelain cup, are vulnerable 
to members of the “disorder family” such as randomness, uncertainty, 
volatility, variability, disturbance, or entropy—terms we use interchangeably 
belowi to explore the fragility of big capital investments. 
 
Fragility as a construct has found increasing use in diverse fields such as 
construction (Shinozuka et al., 2000; Choi et al., 2004); human bones (Seref-
Ferlengez et al., 2015); global financial and banking crises (Davis et al., 1995; 
Taleb et al., 2012; Klemkosky, 2013; Calomiris & Haber, 2014); mathematics 
(Taleb & Douady, 2013); ecology and ecosystems (Nilsson & Grelsson, 1995; 
Sole & Montoya, 2001); interdependent networks (Callaway et al., 2000; 
Buldyrev et al., 2010; Vespignani, 2010; Parshani et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2012; 
Morris & Barthelemy, 2013); material sciences, e.g. in assessing properties of 
glass forming liquids (Scopigno et al., 2001; Mauro et al, 2014; Martinez-
Garcia et al., 2015); conflict-prone countries (USAID, 2005; Ziaja, 2012); 
democratic political systems (Mitchell, 1995; Issacharoff, 2007); and even 
personal ethics (Nussbaum, 2001). Despite its diverse uses, fragility has 
certain common meanings across these fields. Taking our point of departure 
in Taleb’s work, because this is the most comprehensive, and supplementing 
this with other sources, we first distill a general definition of fragility. Second, 
we use this to develop a more specific concept called “investment fragility,” 
which we apply to big capital investments.  
 
Fragility describes, “how [a] system suffers” when it encounters disorder  
(Taleb and Douady, 2012, p. 1677, italics in the original). The outcome of 
fragility is typically an irreversible loss of functionality. Our preliminary 
proposition, which we’ll refine below, is as follows: 
 
Proposition 1. Fragility is typically irreversible. Once 
broken the fragile cannot be readily restored to its original 
function. 
  
Fragility as a material property is signified by a material’s breaking point 
(Scopigno et al., 2003; Martinez-Garcia et al., 2015). Mauro et al. (2014) call this 
unique intrinsic fragility threshold a “structural signature”. Buldyrev et al. 
(2010) conducted similar structural analysis on networks such as electricity 
grids (also see Vespignani, 2010). They find that intrinsic structural features of 
networks—such as number of nodes; whether a network is isolated or 
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interdependent; and number of interconnections with other networks—can 
help determine the “critical threshold” at which the various networks break 
downii. As a more generalizable proposition: 
  
Proposition 2. A thing (material, system, process, or 
network) has a unique “fragility threshold”, which careful 
structural analysis and experimentation can reveal, at 
which it will break down under influence from stressor(s). 
All other things being equal, the lower the preset threshold 
the greater the fragility.   
 
An assumed benefit of big is that the fragility threshold increases with size. 
However, Taleb (2012, pp. 278-80) argues that larger organisms such as 
elephants tend to have a lower fragility threshold as a proportion of their size 
than smaller organisms. Thus, for example, it might take a stone twice the 
body weight of a cat to cause a fatal outcome. But a boulder only half the 
bodyweight of an elephant might suffice for its fragility threshold. The source 
of this disproportionally greater fragility of bigger systems is to be found in 
Anderson’s (XXXX) notion of “more is different.” As a more generalizable 
proposition, we advance:  
 
Proposition 3. As a system grows bigger, the relative size of 
a stressor required to break it will decline disproportionately.  
 
As suggested before another source of fragility is the interconnectedness of 
systems. In other words “inherited fragility.” Inherited fragility helps to map 
out the diffusion of harm in the event of fragility in a corner of an 
interconnected system of systems. As a generalizable proposition: 
 
Proposition 4. In an interdependent system of systems with 
no redundancy the threshold of fragility for the whole 
system of systems is the same as the threshold of the 
system’s weakest component.  
Systems with a low fragility threshold and low function 
recoverability (Quadrant 4) require a great deal of 
cushioning to protect them from breaking. 
 below suggests a composite way to map different things on the spectrum of 
greater to lesser fragility. This constitutes two dimensions: First, on the 
vertical axis is how easily something breaks, i.e. a high or low preset “fragility 
threshold.” Second, on the horizontal axis is how easily can the broken thing 
be recovered to its self-same functional state once the fragility threshold is 
crossed, i.e. high or low “function recoverability.”  
 
However, not all things are as unlucky as Humpty the egg. A multi-use 
electric fuse also breaks easily but can also be easily restored to perform its 
sacrificial function (Quadrant 3). In contrast, a diamond has a high fragility 
threshold but once broken the damage is irreversible (Quadrant 2). Finally, 
fungi—and many systems in nature (Taleb, 2012)—do not break easily and 
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easily recover (Quadrant 1). Incidentally, as our discussion on scalability in 
the next section shows, systems in Quadrant 1 share many properties with 
highly scalable systemsiii.  
Figure 1: A Map Of Fragility 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
Proposition 5. Systems with a low fragility threshold and 
low function recoverability (Quadrant 4) require a great 
deal of cushioning to protect them from breaking. 
 
Closely related to the distinction between “intrinsic” and “inherited” fragility 
is the distinction between “apparent” and “hidden” fragility. The egg’s 
vulnerability to breaking is apparent. We thus handle eggs with care when 
bought at the grocery to cook for tomorrow’s breakfast. We also do not act 
surprised when eggs break. Similarly, an electric fuse’s fragility is apparent 
and in fact intended. In contrast, hidden vulnerability is insidious and entails 
surprise. Vespignani (2010, p. 985) finds that in cases of highly interconnected 
networks breakage is typically “abrupt” at a relatively low critical threshold, 
which introduces an element of surprise: “This makes complete system 
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breakdown even more difficult to anticipate or control than in an isolated 
network.”  
 
Hidden fragility has an interaction effect with inherited fragility: Achilles’ 
heel is a reminder of this phenomenon when a small hidden weakness is 
inherited by the otherwise mighty systemiv.  
 
Proposition 6. The information conditions necessary to 
make a system truly robust are very strong because some 
minor source of hidden fragility is likely to remain. In 
instances of hidden and inherited fragility, seemingly robust 
systems will break down abruptly at a surprisingly low 
critical threshold. Lack of preparedness in instances of 
hidden and inherited fragility will accentuate the 
consequent harm. 
 
Although Taleb (2012, see, e.g., pp. 270-71) underplays the role of cumulative 
processes in creating fragility, hidden fragility is often created or exacerbated 
by them. Taleb typically focuses on fragility caused by one single blow. 
“Cumulative fragility,” in contrast, is death by a thousand cuts. Keil & 
Montealegre (2000) liken such an ill-fated investment to a frog being boiled to 
death without knowing it (also see Keil, 1995; Royer, 2003).  
 
Poorly understood dynamic changes often lower the fragility threshold 
without warning. Even a minor stressor, in such circumstances, leads to 
unexpected breakage. Seref-Ferlengez et al. (2015), for instance, find that 
human bones are constantly exposed to microdamage from routine stressors. 
Microdamage from routine wear and tear begins to accumulate that 
contributes “additively to reduced fracture toughness”—i.e. lowering of the 
threshold at which the bone breaks (Seref-Ferlengez et al., 2015, p.1). In 
technological systems accumulation of small errors is often behind man-made 
disasters (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997).  
 
Proposition 7. Cumulative hidden processes will increase 
the propensity of fragility of a system over time.  
 
Hidden fragility also has sociological and psychological features. Scholars of 
power relationships suggest that organizations can tacitly choose to ignore 
the obvious (Flyvbjerg, 1998) or people in organizations “know that we do not 
want to know” (Ansar, 2015). Psychological biases such as overconfidence also 
“bring fragilities” due to “expert problems (in which the expert knows a lot 
but less than he thinks he does)” (Taleb, 2012, p. 215). Psychological theories 
predict that hidden fragilities in systems designed by experts will be the norm 
not the exception (Kahneman, 2011). NASA lost its $125 million Mars Climate 
Orbiter in September 1999 because one engineering team used metric units 
while another used imperial units for a spacecraft maneuver (Reichhardt, 
1999; also see Hodgkinson & Starbuck, 2012, pp. 2-5 for discussion of NASA’s 
space shuttle disasters in light of theories of organizational decision making). 
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“Our inability to recognize and correct this simple error has had major 
implications,” said Edward Stone, the Director of the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) at NASA that oversaw the mission, according to CNN (30 
September 1999). Also see Proposition 6 on information conditions of 
correcting hidden fragility. 
 
Proposition 8. Behavioral and psychological biases will 
make the detection of hidden fragility more difficult. Hidden 
fragilities in systems designed by experts will be the norm 
not the exception. 
 
Proposition 9. In sociological and organizational contexts, 
hidden fragility will be hidden in plain sight. 
 
Although Taleb has tended to focus on external causes of disorder, ecologists 
working on fragility pay equal attention to internal changes that cause 
fragility (see Nilsson & Grelsson, 1995). Theorists of “broken symmetry” have 
also noted that as internal complexity increases, the threat of internal sources 
of disturbance—often driven by entirely random processes—grows non-
linearly exposing a larger system to breakdown with no apparent cause 
(Anderson, 2011). From a consequentialist perspective, the distinction 
between external and internal stressors is immaterial: it is the magnitude of 
the negative outcome that follows that matters. Taleb (2012, p. 136) argues:  
 
You can control fragility a lot more than you 
think…detecting (anti)fragility—or, actually, smelling it[...]—
is easier, much easier, than prediction and understanding the 
dynamics of events, the entire mission reduces to the central 
principle of what to do to minimize harm (and maximize 
gain) from forecasting errors, that is, to have things that don’t 
fall apart, or even benefit, when we make a mistake...Not 
seeing a tsunami or an economic event coming is excusable; 
building something fragile to them is not.  
 
From a consequentialist perspective, a generalizable proposition that can be 
advanced is as follows: 
 
Proposition 10. If a system or process is systematically 
delivering poor outcomes, it is an indicator of fragility. 
Discard or redesign the system.  
 
Proposition 11. It is easier to be robust against the 
magnitude of harm that fragility might bring than predict 
or control the sources of stressor(s).  
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The Special Case Of “Investment Fragility” 
Above we analyzed general features of fragility. Now we turn to the special 
case of “investment fragility,” which we define as the vulnerability of a financial 
investment to becoming non-viable, i.e., losing its ability to create net economic value. 
When applied to physical assets such as roads, oil refineries, bridges, factories, 
real estate developments etc., investment fragility causes them to become 
“stranded assets”—i.e. where “assets suffer from unanticipated or premature 
write-offs, downward revaluations or are converted to liabilities” (Ansar et al., 
2013, p.2). A broken or stranded asset is a net drag on the economy—i.e. it 
consumes resources inefficiently that could have been put to alternative uses. 
An economy with too many assets prone to fragility is at a heightened risk of 
system-wide failure due to the domino-like effect of inherited fragility that 
can spread from one corner of the system of systems to the whole.  
Benefit-to-Cost Ratio (BCR): A Rule-Of-Thumb To Detect The Investment Fragility 
Threshold 
The fragility threshold of an investment can be located by modeling the 
investment’s payoff structure. Figure 2 illustrates such a payoff structure 
graphically: the discounted stream of gain and the discounted stream of pain 
of a hypothetical investment is sorted in a descending order and then graphed. 
Since investments typically span long time horizons it is imperative to 
incorporate time value of money in the payoff structure by introducing an 
appropriate discount rate (see Souder & Shaver, 2010). The point of fragility in 
Figure 2 is where the cumulative pain—area “1” in Figure 2—just exceeds the 
cumulative gain—the area “2” in Figure 2. In other words, an investment is 
broken when the cumulative gain-to-pain ratio falls below 1, less gain in the 
numerator than the pain in the denominator. The gain-to-pain ratio, which is 
commonly thought of as benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR) in literature on capital 
budgeting, thus serves as a useful rule-of-thumb for detecting the fragility 
threshold of an investment.  
 
Like the more general case of fragility, an asset suffers from greater intrinsic 
investment fragility when the absolute threshold of disturbance required to 
“break” it is low—e.g., a low ex ante benefit-to-cost ratio—whereby a stressor 
easily pushes the benefit-to-cost ratio below 1. The stressor may be, for 
example, just one weather event in the 60-year life of the asset that causes so 
much mess that costs of dealing with it spiral out of proportion. As with 
many fragile things, there is an element of surprise in investment fragility as 
well—seemingly improbable, and often minor, stressor(s) can cause 
disproportionate harm.   
 
An investment is more fragile when once broken it is difficult or nearly 
impossible to reposition it to make recovery possible via alternative uses. Less 
specific assets—for example, buildings that can change use—are less prone to 
becoming irreversibly broken than assets with a higher specificity (see 
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Gómez-Ibáñez, 2003 for a rich ground of interconnections between investment 
fragility and discussion on “hold up” in transaction cost economics).   
Figure 2: Graphing "Investment Fragility" 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Taleb (2012, p. 273). 
 
Similarly, an asset has higher intrinsic investment fragility when its gain 
(anticipated benefits and any windfall) is capped but the pain (anticipated 
cost and any unforeseen losses) is uncapped.  This propensity exhibits itself in 
the shape of Figure 2 in where the top left part of the curve (gain) is bounded 
and finite but the bottom right part of the curve (pain) is unbounded and 
potentially an infinite pit. Based on this observation, Taleb (2012, p. 158, italics 
in the original) proposed: “Fragility implies more to lose than to gain, equals more 
downside than upside, equals (unfavourable) asymmetry.”  
 
What Is Scalability?  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "scalable" and "scalability" in the 
following manner: 
 
"scalable, adj. 
Able to be changed in scale. rare. 
1977   Jrnl. Royal Soc. Arts 125 770/1   Such lasers are scalable since large 
volumes could be pumped uniformly." 
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"scalaˈbility n. the property of being scalable. 
1978   Sci. Amer. Nov. 44/2   It took demonstrations of the scalability of the 
technology and tests of improved beam focusing...to catalyze an effort that led 
to support by the AEC." 
 
We note, in particular, the unsatisfactory definition of the word scalable. 
What does the ability to be changed (or equally change without external 
force) in scale mean? In practice, scalability is most commonly discussed in 
the field of computer science, system architecture, and software programming 
(Hill, 1990; Gunther, 2007). This is insufficient for our purposes. 
 
In academic literature, an understanding of whether, and under what 
conditions, something has the ability to be changed in scale has been deeply 
informed by advances in mathematics and particularly the field of fractal 
geometry. Mandelbrot’s research identified two primary dimensions of scale: 
temporal and spatial. A grain of sand, a pebble, a rock, a cliff, and the 
coastline of say Britain represent a continuum of finer to coarser grades of the 
spatial scale (see Mandelbrot, 1967). Similarly, the price movements of a stock 
price over a scale between five seconds to five years represents finer to coarser 
grades of a temporal scale. Finer and coarser grades of scale can also be 
thought of in terms of degrees of zoom-in (microscopic) and zoom-out 
(macroscopic). To Mandelbrot’s spatial and temporal scale, we introduce a 
third scale: “relational.” The relational scale not only refers to the number of 
end-users (e.g., few or many) but also to the heterogeneity of end-users and 
their tailored need (see Ansar, 2010; Ansar, 2012 for a more extensive 
discussion on a spatial, temporal, and relational multi-scalar framework)v.  
 
Based on this understanding of scale, we define scalability as the ability of a 
thing (e.g., a system, system of systems, process, or network) to effortlessly 
transition back and forth from the very micro to the very macro spatial, 
temporal, and relational scales. Effortlessness connotes minimum friction in 
terms of the time, cost, etc. it takes to build up or remove capacity. Over 
longer time scales, effortlessness implies ability to quickly upgrade without 
losing compatibility. However, if scalability is understood and practiced as 
mainly the ability to scale up, with scant attention to scaling down – which is 
the dominant approach today in both the academy and practice (Sutton and 
Rao 2014) – then this in and of itself adds fragility. Here we therefore 
understand scalability as the ability to change in both directions, i.e., both up 
and down.vi 
 
In contrasting big and scale we arrive at a key insight. Big typically possesses 
a degree of slack, which Weinstock and Goodenough (2006), call the “ability 
to handle increased workload (without adding resources to a system).” A big 
power plant, for example, rarely operates at full capacity. If demand were to 
increase from one segment of the day to another the power plant can be 
ramped up to meet some or all of the added demand. However, this limited 
slack is different from true scalability. Thus, although the big power plant 
might be able to meet some incremental demand in a spatially, temporally, 
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and relationally narrow field, it cannot effortlessly be scaled up (or scaled 
back down) to resolve a national or global energy crisis. Linking big, 
scalability, and fragility we therefore advance the following: 
 
Proposition 12. Fragility arises when big is forced into 
doing what was best left to the scalable.  
 
 
FRAGILITY IN ACTION: EVIDENCE FROM LARGE 
DAMS 
 
The 12 propositions about fragility above are based on a literature study. We 
now test the propositions against evidence from capital investments in 245 
large dams. Our study of large dams began as an inductive enquiry into an 
under-researched question: will the brisk building boom of hydropower 
mega-dams underway from China to Brazil yield a positive return? Our 
previous effort (Ansar et al. 2014) found strong evidence that most large dams 
were too costly and took too long to build to deliver a positive risk-adjusted 
return. Our empirical results motivated us to begin theory development that 
would help us answer why investments in large dams might be particularly 
prone to what we above call “investment fragility,” i.e. for the benefit-cost 
ratio to fall below 1?  
 
Figure 3 presents an overview of the dataset by regional location of the dams, 
wall height, project type, vintage, and actual project cost. With a total value of 
$353bn (2010 prices) built between 1934 to 2007 on five continents in 65 
different countries, our dataset on large dams is the largest of its kind.  All 
large dams for which valid and reliable cost and schedule data could be 
found were included in the study. The data and the inductive study are 
described in Ansar et al. (2014).  
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Figure 3: Sample Distribution Of 245 Large Dams (1934-2007), Across Five 
Continents, Worth USD 353B (2010 Prices) 
 
  
Source: Ansar et al. (2014) 
 
Why Study Big Dams? 
We find that large dams serve a particularly useful empirical setting to 
develop theory on investment fragility for the following reasons.  
 
Actual Project Cost (2010 USD millions), percent 
Location 
East Asia 
72 
Africa 
50 40 
29 
Europe 
29 
25 
South Asia 
North America Latin America 
Size - Dam Wall Height (m)   
15-29 
30-44 
45-59 60-99 
≥150 
100-149 
61 
Project Type  
Irrigation &  
other 
97 
89 
Project Vintage 
Hydropower 
Multipurpose  
(with hydropower) 
1980-1989 
1990-2007 1934-1949 
1950-1969 
1970-1979 
59 
7.5% 
10.0% 
12.5% 
40,000 
0.0% 
2.5% 
5.0% 
1,000 10 
Millions of 2010 US dollars 
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First, big dams are archetypical megaprojects. Dams are bespoke, site-specific 
constructions that have large physical proportions; require mobilization of 
vast quantities of inputs (materials, land, labor, or physical equipment); entail 
huge up-front financial outlays; generate a large number of unit of outputs; 
take a long time to build; last a long time; are spatially fixated; are highly 
complex not only in terms of number of constituent parts but also in terms of 
high interdependencies between constituent parts. Large dams typically also 
impact large numbers of people and the environment in their construction, 
operation, and eventual removal.  
 
Second, dams are indivisible and discrete assets. A 90% complete dam is as 
valueless as a dam not built at all. For this reason, the physical scope and 
costs associated with a dam are methodologically well-defined and therefore 
particularly well-suited for like-for-like comparisons between planned and 
actual outcomes.  
 
Third, the main part of the whole-life costs of a dam are rendered up front during the 
construction phase. Unlike, thermal power plants, dams do not require large 
variable costs in subsequent time periods for feedstock. There is a degree of 
transparency possible with the cash flows (or streams of costs and benefits) 
associated with dams that is much more difficult to establish for other big 
capital investments.  
 
Finally, results from large dams are generalizable to other big venture. Large dams 
are a widely studied engineering problem, or what conventional theory might 
consider “a standardized production technology” (Sidak & Spulber, 1997), 
generating basic services, such as electricity or water, as outputs with 
seemingly established demand trends. Intuition would suggest that the 
overall planning uncertainties ought to be more limited in large dams than, 
for example, big capital investments based on revolutionary new technologies. 
A discovery of systemic errors in the building of dams would be indicative 
that the problems of investment fragility will be even more severe for less 
standardized capital investments.   
 
What Happens To Big Dams?  
Proposition 10 in the previous section suggested that if a system or process is 
systematically delivering poor outcomes it is an indicator of fragility. 
Specifically, we are interested in testing whether benefit-cost ratios fall below 
1.  
Cost Performancevii  
With respect to cost overruns, we make the following observations: 
- 3 out of every 4 large dams suffered a cost overrun in constant local 
currency terms. 
- Actual costs were on average 96% higher than estimated costs (median 
27%; IQR 0.86). The evidence is overwhelming that costs are 
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systematically biased towards underestimation and overrun (Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon U = 29646, p < 0.01); the magnitude of cost 
underestimation is larger than the error of cost overestimation (p < 
0.01). The skew is towards adverse outcomes (i.e. going over budget).  
Graphing the dams’ cost overruns reveals a long tail as shown in  
- Figure 4; the actual costs more than double for 2 out of every 10 large 
dams and more than triple for 1 out of every 10 dams. The long tail 
suggests that planners have difficulty in establishing probabilities of 
events that happen far into the future (Taleb, [2007] 2010, p. 284). 
 
Figure 4: Density Trace Of Actual/Estimated Cost (i.e. Costs Overruns) In 
Constant Local Currency Terms With The Median And Mean (N = 245)  
 
Schedule Performanceviii  
Not only are large dams costly and prone to systematic and severe budget 
overruns, they also take a long time to build. Large dams on average take 8.6 
years. With respect to schedule slippage, we make the following observations: 
 
- 8 out of every 10 large dams suffered a schedule overrun 
- Actual implementation schedule was on average 44% (or 2.3 years) 
higher than the estimate (median 27%, or 1.7 years) as shown in Figure 
5. A schedule overrun is detrimental to the benefit-cost ratio as it 
Median 
Mean 
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delays when much-needed benefits come on line. This decreases the 
net present value of future benefits. Even without a cost overrun, a 
schedule delay in and of itself can cause investment fragility. As the 
bulk of the costs of a big dam are incurred upfront they are not as 
sensitive to the discount rate as the benefits, which arrive farther in the 
future. 
 
- Like cost overruns, the evidence is overwhelming that implementation 
schedules are systematically biased towards underestimation (Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon U = 29161, p < 0.01); the magnitude of schedule 
underestimation (i.e. schedule slippage) is larger than the error of 
schedule overestimation (p < 0.01).  
 
Graphing the dams’ schedule overruns also reveals a long tail as shown in  
- Figure 5, albeit not as long as the tail of cost overruns. Costs are at a 
higher risk of spiraling out of control than schedules.  
 
Figure 5: Density Trace Of Schedule Slippage (N = 239) With The Median 
And Mean 
Median 
Mean 
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Investment Fragility Threshold For Big Dams  
Proposition 2 advanced that different systems have different fragility 
thresholds. For big dams the typical forecasted benefit-cost ratio (BCR) was 
1.4. In other words, planners expected the net present benefits to exceed the 
net present costs by about 40%. With no change in future benefits or 
operations & management costs, a project suffering a cost overrun ratio of 1.4 
or greater thus breach the fragility threshold—its BCR would fall below 1 and 
the broken asset’s upfront sunk costs would become unrecoverable.  
 
- The absolute threshold of 1.4 for big dams is broadly in line with many 
other physical infrastructure assets such as road, rail, bridge, or tunnel 
capital investments that too typically expect to generate a BCR of 
approximately 1.4 (NAO, 2014).  
 
- Using the BCR of 1.4 as the fragility threshold, we found that 
investments in big dams are more fragile than investments in road, 
bridge, or tunnel projects. Investments in big rail projects are, however, 
even more fragile than investments in big dams.  We arrived at this 
conclusion comparing the evidence on 245 big dams with a sample of 
another 353 roads, rail, and fixed link (bridges and tunnels) projects 
(see Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2003, 2005; Ansar et al., 2013). 
 
- Investments in nearly half (47%) of the dams broke the fragility 
threshold, i.e., a cost overrun ratio of 1.4 or greater, compared to 14% 
for roads (n = 239, MCost Ovverun = 1.22) and 25% for fixed links (n = 39, 
MCost Ovverun = 1.37). For rail projects (n = 79, MCost Ovverun = 1.44) just 
over 50% of the sample had a cost overrun ratio greater than 1.4.  
 
- In terms of runaway cost overruns, however, investments in big dams 
have a worse performance than rail projects. For big dams the 80th 
percentile cost overrun is nearly double the original estimate (P80 Cost 
Ovverun = 1.99) and the 90th percentile more than triple (P90 Cost Ovverun = 
3.07) suggesting a long and fat tail. For rail the skew towards runaway 
cost overruns is less pronounced (P80 Cost Ovverun = 1.75 and P90 Cost 
Ovverun = 1.90) suggesting a truncated tail compared to big dams, 
though still long and fat compared to a normal distribution.  
 
- Our calculations of the fragility threshold of big dams have a 
conservative bias. We have assumed that dams' benefits did not also 
fall short of targets, even though there is strong evidence in the existing 
literature that this is the case (WCD, 2000a; McCully, 2001; Scudder, 
2005). We made this assumption because a comprehensive dataset of 
planned versus actual benefits of dams, like we have built for cost and 
schedule of big dams, does not yet exist. Data we have available on 84 
hydroelectric large dam projects from our sample thus far suggests that 
they suffer a mean benefits shortfall of at least 11%.  
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Note that big dams suffer from the fundamental unfavorable asymmetry of 
fragile systems: the potential gain from big dams is capped but the pain is 
uncapped (see Figure 2). For example, in years of extreme drought a big 
hydropower dam may produce next to no power, but in years of floods the 
dams’ ability to generate electricity is capped at the maximum of its design 
limit. So the maximum benefits the dams can produce are bounded but 
maximum losses—either from upfront cost overruns or subsequent operation 
& maintenance costs—are not. Factoring in benefit shortfalls and cost 
overruns on operation & maintenance costs, a bigger proportion of 
investments in big dams likely break than our conservative calculations 
suggest.  
 
In summary, our conservative estimates suggest that investments in nearly 
half the dams break before the big dams even begin their operational life. This 
is due to outsized cost overruns on the upfront capital expenditure. Fragility 
at such an early stage of an investment’s life cycle can be likened to an 
investment stillbirth. Subsequent discussion will show that the investment 
fragility risk only increases for durable and immobile big assets as their life 
progresses due to “cumulative fragility.”  
 
Why Do Investments in Big Dams Break?  
The explanation for why investments in big dams break can be found in the 
thought processes that lead to their construction. We reviewed previously 
confidential business cases (called Staff Appraisal Report or Project Appraisal 
Document) at the World Bank presented to the Bank’s Board prior to a final 
decision to build big dams. A typical business case puts forth the following 
line of argumentation to justify financing for a dam: 
 
- First, the business case outlines the massive electricity or water 
shortfall a country faces; 
- Second, the business case argues that the country possesses large 
untapped hydropower resources; 
- Third, the business case proposes that a big dam should be built on a 
site deemed to be particularly advantageous by experts. The business 
case goes on to argue that the proposed big dam will be a big 
increment in solving the electricity or water scarcity of the country;  
- Fourth, the business case cites technical studies which show that the 
big dam will be capable of quickly filling the gap between current 
market need and market supply and offer slack to meet surging future 
demand;  
- Fifth, the business case also cites studies by economists, that the 
proposed big dam will be the “least costly expansion path that will 
adequately meet the projected demand” owing to its “economies of 
scale” (U.S. Department of Energy, 2009). Usually only one or two 
other alternatives are considered;    
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- Finally, detailed calculations are shown—sometimes spanning several 
appendices—that the present value of benefits of the proposed big dam, 
as of the date of the decision to build, will exceed the present value of 
the costs. In other words, that the benefit-cost ratio will exceed 1. 
Typically, little to no data on costs and benefits are shown for 
competing alternatives. 
 
This thought process resembles more the rationalization of a pre-selected 
solution (a large dam) than the rational assessment of alternative ways to 
solve a given problem (provision of water and electricity). The process is 
rationalization presented as rationality (Flyvbjerg 1998). We identify several 
deep flaws. 
 
First, although the typical business case correctly identifies the challenge as 
one of scalability – i.e., to effortlessly turn on or off the supply of electricity and 
water anywhere (spatial), anytime (temporal), and for anyone (relational) – 
instead of proposing a scalable solution the business case proceeds to propose 
a single-shot big fix. Recall Proposition 12:  Fragility arises when big is forced into 
doing what was best left to the scalable.  
Second, the number of alternatives considered against the preferred solution 
is few if any. Alternatives such a decentralized generation or improving 
energy productivity are ignored. As Priemus (2008, p. 105) illustrates, it is 
typical for planners to settle early on a big asset as the preferred solution and 
then alternatives are “whittled down to nothing.” This limits the option set 
presented to decision makers.   
 
Third, by invoking the logic of purported economies of scale (by way of least 
cost expansion path), the business case then proposes building a staggeringly 
big dam since the bigger the dam the more scalable and efficient it appears on 
paper. Even as a typical business case worries a great deal about efficiency 
that might arise out of big size, it fails to dwell on the non-linear risks that 
will arise from big commitments to durable and immobile assets.   
 
The Various Facets Of Investment Fragility in Big Dams  
Thus far we have empirically substantiated the essential argument of this 
chapter that big capital investments are prone to fragility particularly when 
big is used as a blunt substitute for scalability. In particular we have looked at 
evidence for Propositions 2, 10, and 13. We now turn to finding empirical 
support for other propositions advanced in the theory section.  
 
Proposition 1 advanced that fragility is typically irreversible. In the empirical 
setting of investments in big dams this proposition takes on two facets. First, 
once the investment is broken – typically due to an upfront cost overrun – it is 
nearly impossible to reposition the asset to generate a positive return—i.e. 
increasing revenues to pay back the escalated up-front costs and debt 
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financing on them proves elusive as best. The Yacyretá Hydroelectric 
Project—a joint venture between Argentina and Paraguay under the Yacyretá 
Treaty on the Parana River started in 1973 and only fully completed 38 years 
later in 2011 according the treaty’s intended proposal—is a telling case. The 
dam operated at 60% of its intended capacity from 1998 onwards. In June 2001, 
the World Bank—one of the dam’s financiers—published its Implementation 
Completion Report (ICR), which arrived at the following conclusion about the 
project’s outcome: 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that the project has not met its 
goals as there is no solution on how to terminate the project, and 
operate at full capacity. As explained, the project has operated for 
a prolonged period of time at an unintended level [below 
intended capacity]. In addition, the project presents a poor ERR 
[Economic Rate of Return], negative NPV [Net Present Value] 
recalculated by this ICR, and uncertain project sustainability. As 
a result, the outcome of Loan 3520-AR is rated unsatisfactory, 
and the outcome of the Yacyretá scheme as a whole is rated 
unsatisfactory mainly because of its big negative NPV ( p. 6).  
 
The project’s lower-than-expected volume of output was exacerbated by a 
lower-than-expected price of electricity. The World Bank (2001) report goes on 
to explain that the Yacyretá dam has a “big negative NPV” because “the spot 
price [of electricity sold] has been (and is estimated to remain so after year 
2001) lower than US$30 per MWh [agreed in the 40-year 1973 treaty].” The 
ICR did not envision a scenario in which the dam would revert to a positive 
NPV due to the sheer scale of costs sunk into the project.  
 
Second, the breaking of an investment—unlike the porcelain cup at the 
beginning of this chapter—happens in slow motion. Yet decision-makers 
appear unable to reverse commitment to the losing course of action. In the 
case of Yacyretá dam, the World Bank’s Project Performance Audit Report—
prepared by the World Bank’s independent evaluation department, found: 
“[World] Bank performance is rated as unsatisfactory. The appraisal 
overlooked the downside risk of a slower demand growth, which proved to 
be of paramount importance. Later, opportunities to reassess the project were 
wasted in spite of the recommendations made by a good quality and timely 
Public Investment Review (PIR) in 1985. The Bank also accepted non-
compliance with financial covenants” (World Bank, 1996b, p. 14). The 
Yacyretá dam’s Project Performance Audit Report (World Bank, 1996b, p. 16) 
neatly summed up the insidious but irreversible fragility of big capital 
investments, “In several occasions the Bank had a good case for stopping the 
project before the major civil works were too advanced.” But it did not. The 
phenomenon, whereby smart people and organizations are unable to stop 
themselves from throwing good money after bad goes by many names in the 
academic literature such as escalation of commitment or lock-in (McNamara 
et al., 2002). The financial magnitude of a big venture is so large that once 
started the commitment turns into a binding, ruinous, co-dependence.  
 
 22 
Proposition 3 suggested that proportionality matters when considering the 
impact of fragility. In the case of dams, an investment in a big dam built in a 
poor country plays out very differently when compared to an investment in a 
similar big dam built in a rich country. This position appears so obvious as to 
be trivial, but the real-life effects are striking.  
 
Big dams built in North America (n = 40) have considerably lower cost 
overrun (M = 11%) than big dams built elsewhere (M = 104%) as show in 
Figure 6. Note, however, that 3 out of 4 dams in our reference class had a 
North American firm advising on the engineering and economic forecasts. 
Consistent with anchoring theories in psychology, we interpret this 
observation as an indication of an overreliance on the North American 
experience with large dams, which appears to be biasing cost estimates 
downwards in the rest of the world. Experts may be “anchoring” their 
forecasts in familiar cases from North America and applying insufficient 
“adjustments” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), for 
example to adequately reflect the risk of a local currency depreciation or the 
quality of local project management teams. Proponents often hold up the 
Hoover Dam—finished in 1936 in the U.S.—as a prime example for why 
similarly big dams ought to be built in poor countries. Evidence shows, 
however, that the likes of Hoover dam are false analogies. Instead decision 
makers in developing countries should consider evidence for the entire dam 
record, and in the case of big dams, investment fragility is the most likely 
outcome in developing countries. 
 
Figure 6: Location Of Large Dams In The Sample And Cost Overruns By 
Geography  
! 0 25 50 75 100 200 500Average cost overrun (%)
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Similarly, with respect to construction schedule, we find that countries with a 
higher per capita income tend to have lower schedule overruns than countries 
with lower per capita income. We concur with the interpretation of Bacon and 
Besant-Jones (1998, p. 325) that “the best available proxy for most countries is 
[the] country-per-capita income…[for] the general level of economic support 
that a country can provide for the construction of complex facilities”. This 
result reinforces the argument that developing countries in particular, despite 
seemingly the most in need of complex facilities such as large dams, ought to 
stay away from bites bigger than they can chew.  
 
Finally, when an investment in a big dam breaks in a poor country, the 
country’s economy as a whole more readily inherits that fragility by way of 
accumulating debt. Brazil's Itaipu Dam was built in the 1970s. It cost nearly 
$20 billion, 240% more in real terms than predicted and it impaired Brazil's 
public finances for three decades. Similarly, the actual cost of Tarbela dam, 
the majority of which was borrowed from external sources, amounted to 23% 
of the increase in Pakistan’s external public debt stock between 1968-1984; or 
12% for Colombia’s Chivor dam (1970-1977) as shown in Table 1. Companies 
and countries with insufficiently large balance sheets to absorb adverse 
outcomes of big bets gone awry face financial ruin.  
 
 
Table 1: Total Stock Of Public Net External Debt (US$ Current, MM) 
Year Colombia Pakistan  
1968  3,252.4 
1970 1,296.6  
1977 2,699.6  
1984  9,692.8 
Debt increase over the 
implementation 
schedule 
1,403.0 6,440.5 
Cost of mega-dam 
over the relevant 
period (US$ current 
MM) 
Chivor dam Tarbela dam 
 168.7 1,497.90 
Cost of dam as percentage of debt increase  
  12.0% 23.2% 
Source: Ansar et al. (2014) 
 
As the discussion leading to Propositions 5 & 6 above showed, there is 
typically an aspiration to make a seemingly fragile system more robust. In 
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investment fragility terms, this means building in a contingency as a buffer 
against cost overruns. The conventional logic being that if a project returns a 
BCR greater than 1 even after taking the contingency into account then the 
investment can be considered robust—i.e. it will not easily cross the fragility 
threshold. Evidence suggests, however, that standard contingencies are too 
low. For example, in providing a contingency against inflation for big dams in 
our sample, forecasters expected the annual inflation rate to be 2.5% on 
average, but it turned out to be 18.9% (averages for the entire sample). Had 
adequate contingencies been provided, the benefit-cost ratios would have 
been lower and investments would not have readily received the final go-
ahead.  
 
Sensitivity analysis is another mechanism by which an aspiration to 
robustness is formalized in business cases of big capital investments. But like 
contingencies, this exercise—as customarily conducted in business cases of 
big capital investments—is perfunctory.  A typical ex ante sensitivity analysis 
stress tests for a very narrow range of variance around the base case, whereas 
the actual ex post evidence shows that a very wide range ought to have been 
tested. The difficulty is that when the sensitivity analysis range is widened 
from the narrowest confines to reflect real-life variance, the business case falls 
apart. The before versus after picture of Colombia’s Guavio hydroelectric 
project is illustrative.  
 
Figure 7 exhibits a facsimile of a representative section on benefit-to-cost 
analysis from the World Bank’s 1981 Staff Appraisal Report of Colombia’s 
Guavio hydroelectric project, which gave the final decision to build the dam. 
As the facsimile illustrates, planners of Guavio first conducted a base case 
scenario that showed that the dam had a positive economic rate of return (of 
15%) greater than the opportunity cost of capital (11%). Planners then 
conducted a sensitivity analysis on the base case benefits and costs but only 
subjected them to a stress test range of ±15%. The planners, despite 
acknowledging that their estimated were subject to uncertainty, appear 
reluctant to test for extreme events even if such events are characteristic for 
large dams, as we saw with the long, fat tails above.  
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Figure 7: An Aspiration To Investment Robustness in Guavio Hydroelectric 
Project 
 
 
Source: World Bank (1981, p. 42) 
 
 
As it turned out, the Colombian utility that owned the Guavio dam went 
bankrupt (World Bank, 1996a, p. iii). The dam’s actual outturn costs (in local 
currency constant prices) spiraled six times their estimate. Instead of the +15% 
cost overrun that the ex ante sensitivity analysis allowed for, a +500% stress 
test would have been more appropriate! The investment in Guavio did not 
just break. It shattered.  
 
The World Bank’s Implementation Completion Report, which reported the ex post 
outcomes of the Guavio dam conceded that the investment in Guavio was 
broken even before the hydroelectric project began operational life. 
“Generally speaking the project's outcome has to be considered highly 
unsatisfactory…this has been at a high cost, particularly in terms of the non-
viability (financial and economic) of the project at completion” (World Bank, 
1996, p. iv).  
 
Proposition 7 advanced that cumulative, and often hidden, processes increase a 
system’s fragility over time. With respect to big dams, we have thus far 
focused on investment fragility that happens at the beginning of the life of a 
big dam due to a cost overrun that exceeds the expected future benefits. Now 
we turn to the “cumulative investment fragility” of big dams as they age. This 
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occurs when large costs are incurred to repair, overhaul, or decommission the 
ageing big dam. These late-life costs can turn an aging big dam into a liability 
in perpetuity. We review two case examples to elucidate cumulative fragility 
both from a material and an investment perspective.  
 
Cumulative material fatigue from minor stressors, poor maintenance, and 
new demands placed on an infrastructure can cause physical collapse without 
warning. The sudden structural collapse of the Stava dams in the Eastern 
Italian Alps on 19 July 1985 that resulted in 268 human fatalities is a tragic 
case of physical fragility brought on due to years of neglect. The Stava dams, 
even though visibly in a state of decay, had kept on performing their intended 
function. Since the cost of rehabilitating the dams was high, the owners—the 
Prealpi Mining Co. of Bergamoix—felt little pressing need to act. The dams 
then collapsed with no apparent discreet cause—a hallmark of cumulative 
fragility (see Luino & Graff, 2012, p. 1042). The physical fragility of the dams 
and the resulting casualties also caused investment fragility: financial 
liabilities for the clean up exceeded €130 million and criminal sentences for 
many of the individuals involved in the operation of the dams.  
 
A dramatic physical collapse is, however, not necessary to inflict cumulative 
investment fragility. The Kariba dam, on the border between Zimbabwe and 
Zambia, presents a salient and current casex. The Kariba hydroelectric 
program was built in two phases. The first phase entailed the construction of 
the dam wall, which had a height of 128 m and impounded Lake Kariba—the 
largest man-made lake in the world at the time. In contrast to the typical big 
dam, Kariba Phase 1 was built at breakneck speed. The civil works were 
completed in just four years from 1955 to 1959. The first electricity was 
generated in January 1960 (WCD, 2000b, p. 9). All 6 generators installed 
during the first phase were in operation by 1962, with a capacity of 666MW—
which exceeded the intended scope of 500MW. Kariba’s Phase 1 is also among 
the rare big dams that came in on budget; built within its then £80.8 million 
budget envelope (World Bank, 1956; WCD, 2000b).  
 
Kariba’s Phase 1 thus appears to have beaten the odds to a healthy birth. But 
cumulative processes have pushed Kariba towards investment fragilityxi. 
Outflows of water from the dam’s sluice gates have, over time, eroded the 
plunge pool below the gates. The pool, which was initially 10m deep has 
gradually worn down to over 80m eroding towards the dam wall’s 
foundations as shown in Figure 8. The structural integrity of Kariba dam is 
now under a pressing threat.  
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Figure 8: Cumulative Fragility: Erosion Near The Foundation Of Kariba 
Dam Wall 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014, Figure 2) 
 
The cumulative fatigue of Kariba dam’s structure has placed decision makers 
in an unenviable “squeeze”: either allow the dam to collapse and bear 
unthinkable human, environmental, and financial losses or embrace huge 
outlays to maintain the dam in perpetuity. For now four institutions—the 
European Union, Swedish Government, African Development Bank, and the 
World Bank—have spurned into action to provide $295 million in loans to 
undertake repairs that are expected to take at least ten years (World Bank, 
2014). Although the scour in the plunge pool is the most pressing problem 
facing the Kariba, a number of other issues have begun to creep up such as 
the swelling of the concrete and malfunctioning of flood gates. Kariba’s 
maintenance bills are unlikely to be a fixed predictable sum with a clear end 
date. Whether donors will find sources of finance in perpetuity to maintain 
the dam is an open question.  
 
Kariba’s material fatigue is a reminder that big dams have finite life spans. 
Even if not in the next decade or two, in foreseeable human history a big dam 
like Kariba will have to be removed (even if it were to be rebuilt) lest it were 
to accidentally collapse. No on has the remotest idea how much will need to 
be spent on the end-of-life arrangements of a big dam like Kariba. Such 
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rehabilitation and demise costs were not anticipated in Kariba’s original BCR 
analysis. 95% of the world’s big dams were built in the last century and many 
are approaching the stated end of their service lives (Lavigne, 2005). Will 
dams less illustrious than the Kariba find resources for repairs in perpetuity? 
Or will the forgotten dams only be heard of when they collapse from 
cumulative fatigue like the Stava dams? There are over 45,000 big dams in the 
world. Who will pay for their decommissioning or reconstruction? 
 
Proposition 8 suggested that cognitive biases make it difficult for laypeople 
and experts alike to detect fragility. The Vajont dam in Italy is perhaps a 
particularly unfortunate case illustrative of psychological and sociological 
dimensions of fragility. Located 100 km north of Venice, Vajont was the 
world’s highest thin arch dam with a height exceeding 260 meters—
equivalent to a 60-storey skyscraper—at its completion in 1960. The dam was 
built across the Vajont Valley, a deep, narrow gorge characterized by massive, 
near-vertical cliffs. On 9 October 1963 a giant landslide collapsed into the 
reservoir at an unanticipated speed, which generated a 250-meter tsunami 
that overtopped the dam destroying villages downstream. Nearly 2,000 
people died. Apart from levying exacting human loss, the dam also lost its 
economic function.  
 
Although the proximate cause of Vajont’s fragility appears to be an 
unexpected natural disaster, the root causes point to biases of human 
judgment under uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and 
Lovallo, 1993; Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, 2011). The literature 
in psychology suggests that experts (e.g., statisticians, engineers, or 
economists) and laypersons are systematically and predictably prone to errors 
when forming judgments under uncertainty. Biases, such as overconfidence 
or overreliance on heuristics (rules-of-thumb) underpin these errors, which 
result in the underestimation of risk.  
 
The behavior of the experts responsible for building Vajont is consistent with 
such cognitive biases: By November 1960 it had become clear that the rock 
mass sloping towards the reservoir behind the dam was severely fractured. 
Experts reached the conclusion that it was not possible to completely stop the 
landslide but nonetheless “assumed that by elevating the level of the reservoir 
in a careful manner…the rate of movement [of the sliding mass] could be 
controlled” (Petley, 2008; also see Semenza & Ghirotti, 2000; Kilburn & Petley, 
2003). Experts’ psychological confidence that they could control the landslide 
is consistent with the notion of “illusion of control,” a tendency for people to 
overestimate their ability to control outcomes (Kahneman & Riepe, 1998).  
Experts’ illusion of control was exacerbated by a systematic underestimation 
of variance of the underlying risk factors they faced. Experts built several 
scale models to simulate the potential outcomes of a landslide into the 
reservoir behind the Vajont dam wall. However, these models did not 
consider the cumulative effect that a large mass might have if it slid at very 
high speed, which turned out to be the eventual outcome (Marco, 2012, p. 145-
46).  
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In line with Proposition 9, we find that at the organizational level such 
psychological biases appear not to be readily attenuated. For example, we 
analyzed whether cost estimates of big dams have become more accurate 
over time. The idea being that even if psychological causes led to errors in 
earlier projects, organizational factors would intervene over time to 
attenuate psychological biases. In contrast, our statistical analysis suggested 
that irrespective of the year or decade in which a dam was built there are no 
significant differences in forecasting errors (F = 0.57, p = 0.78). Similarly, we 
did not observe a trend indicating improvement or deterioration of 
forecasting errors (F = 0.54, p = 0.46) as also suggested by  
Figure 9. Organizations appear to not be learning from past mistakes.  Why 
organizations fail to attenuate adverse outcomes of psychological biases 
continues to be a lively area of future research (see Durand, 2003; Makadok, 
2011).   
 
Figure 9: Inaccuracy Of Cost Estimates (Local Currencies, Constant Prices) 
For Large Dams Over Time (N=245), 1934-2007  
 
Mean 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Megaprojects, in the private and public sectors alike, are more ubiquitous and 
bigger than ever before. These big capital investments are justified on the 
basis of theories of big that underpin two aspirations: An aspiration to 
efficiency from purported economies of size or scope; and an aspiration to 
scalability from building capacity ahead of demand. We found that big 
investments have a poor track record in delivering on either aspiration. 
Contrary to the conventional proposition of “bigger is better,” we found big 
capital investments to have a propensity to fragility—vulnerability of the 
investments to become unrecoverable due to the impact of random events(s).  
 
Our theoretical argument can be summarized as follows: the emphasis of 
theories of big on efficiency and building capacity ahead of demand 
encourages managers to take “definitive, static bets” on big ventures 
(Klingebiel &Adner, 2015, p. 222). What theories of big fail to incorporate in 
their logic is that oversizing a system increases its complexity 
disproportionately due to the greater number of permutations of interactions 
now possible among more sub-components, and this leads to fragility. Small 
errors in one or a few interactions of the bigger system magnify. All of this 
exerts a financial toll: propensity to cost overruns at construction; 
unexpectedly large bills in fixing new vulnerabilities when they become 
apparent as the system ages; and huge clean-up costs if the system has to be 
decommissioned or if it collapses. Despite their Goliath appearance, big 
capital investments break easily—i.e. deliver negative net present value-- 
when faced with disturbances. A greater propensity to fragility is intrinsic to 
big investments.  
 
We further argue that conventional theory has conflated big with scalability. 
Big entails being bespoke and complex with multiple attributes such as large 
upfront financial outlays, durable temporal horizons, spatial immobility, and 
ability to produce large units of outputs. In contrast, scalability is best 
understood by considering the difference between a live musical performance 
and a digital recording of the same music. The live concert is only available at 
the prescribed place (spatial), at the prescribed time (temporal), and to a 
limited audience (relational). Anyone can enjoy the digital recording, 
anywhere, anytime. The live concert does not scale. The recording is scalable. 
Fragility arises when big is forced into doing what was best left to the scalable. 
 
We substantiate our argument using evidence from a dataset of 245 big dams 
with a total value of $353bn (2010 prices) built 1934 to 2007 on five continents 
in 65 different countries. Our primary findings are: 
• Nearly half the dams we studied suffered a cost overrun so large for the 
projects to be considered broken even before they began operations. That 
is, the capital sunk up front could not be recovered. Fragility at such an 
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early stage of an investment’s life cycle can be likened to an investment 
stillbirth.   
• Cost risks for big dam have fat tails – the actual costs more than doubles 
for 2 out of 10 dams; triples for 1 out of every 10 big dams. 
• Managers do not seem to learn. Forecasts today are likely to be as wrong 
as they were between 1934-2007. 
• Costs aside, big dams take a very long time to build, on average 8 years, 
which is a late coming to solve pressing energy and water needs.  
• Investment fragility risk increases as the life of a big dam progresses due 
to cumulative processes—such as material fatigue and threat of 
catastrophic failure—which trigger need for costly rehabilitation in 
perpetuity.    
• Costs of maintaining or removing big dams past their intended service 
lives is a looming financial liability.  
• The companies or countries that undertake big investments inherit their 
fragility. For example, the outsized costs of big dams and similar 
megaprojects have caused an explosive growth of debt in developing 
countries hamstringing their economic potential. Developing countries, 
despite seemingly the most in need of complex facilities such as big dams, 
ought to stay away from projects that are big relative to the national 
economy. 
 
Ought decision-makers abandon all big ventures? Of course not. But decision-
makers must carefully assess when bigger is better, instead of unthinkingly 
assume this is the case. Evidence suggests that on a risk-adjusted basis more 
often than is assumed big ventures are unlikely to present good value. Top 
decision-makers responsible for giving the final green light to a big capital 
investment ought to remain skeptical of the numbers presented to them at 
appraisal. Decision-makers should also seek to de-bias estimates of time to 
task completion, costs, and benefits by demanding more extreme stress tests, 
reflecting the full variance of phenomena, to determine the fragility threshold 
of the investment they are about to undertake. We would also advise against 
making big capital investments decisions on razor-thin margins. Big 
investments need far more cushioning to avoid fragility than current 
management practice tends to assume.  
 
If big is fragile, what’s the alternative? We do not have the space here to 
answer this question. Elsewhere, we study managers who work by the 
heuristic, "If big is fragile, then break it down," to deliver their projects 
successfully, and we study theories that support this approach, such as 
theories of modularization (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Schilling & Steensma, 
2001; Garud et al., 2003; Levinson, 2006); real options in product innovation 
(Klingebiel & Adner 2015), and greater user-producer co-development 
(Grabher et al., 2008, Ansar, 2012). We hope to report from this work later. For 
now, we conclude that prior to committing to a big venture, managers should 
rigorously consider possible alternatives. Scholars should similarly carefully 
re-evaluate theories of big. Our data indicate that the current tendency to 
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accept theories of big at face value and lock in early in capital project decision 
making to a big “favorite solution,” often erring towards the monumental, 
drives fragility and therefore incurs a high risk of failure. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
i Future efforts may require drawing more careful distinctions among the members of the 
disorder family (also see Goldstein & Taleb, 2007 on volatility).  
ii Buldyrev et al. (2010, p. 1025) report, “For an isolated single network, a significant number 
of the network nodes must be randomly removed before the network breaks down. However, 
when taking into account the dependencies between the networks, removal of only a small 
fraction of nodes can result in the complete fragmentation of the entire system.” 
iii Not all things fit neatly in the proposed 2 X 2 matrix in Figure 1. Although it is possible to 
glue back together a broken antique porcelain cup to restore the function of drinking tea, it is 
aesthetically displeasing. Similarly, Humpty the cannon could have been restored to its 
defensive function. But that proved unachievable in the time available despite the effort of 
“all the king’s horses and all the king’s men.” The temporary fragility of the cannon, however, 
irreversibly spread to the Royalists forces. Thus even where a broken system is highly 
recoverable three questions still remain relevant: i) What effort (e.g., cost or time) will the 
recovery take? ii) What harm might occur to other things (i.e. inherited fragility) during the 
down time in which the recovery takes place? iii) Will the recovery yield a functional inferior? 
What this suggests is that to make a system that has a high fragility threshold and is easily 
restored to its original function is incredibly difficult.  
iv In Greek mythology, when Achilles was a baby, it was foretold that he would die young. To 
prevent his death, his mother Thetis took Achilles to the River Styx, which was supposed to 
offer powers of invulnerability, and dipped his body into the water. But as Thetis held 
Achilles by the heel, his heel was not washed over by the water of the magical river. 
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v Other academic fields such as geography and ecology have also taken a keen interest in 
scale and typically use similar language—e.g., finer or coarse/broader scale—as Mandelbrot 
(Wiens, 1989; Wu & David, 2002). Perhaps the noteworthy difference is that whereas 
geometry tends to treat scale as a continuum, scholars in geography or ecology have 
preferred to conceptualize scale as a nested hierarchical structure such as Russian dolls. For 
example, a street, block, neighborhood, borough, city, province, country, region, continent, 
the planet, the solar system etc. are a nested spatial structure. Although, the nested 
hierarchical structure conceptualization a blunt approximation, as long as the zoomed-out 
scales in a nested structure are not conflated with bigger we are not against the use of such an 
approximation to aid understanding. 
vi Our definition of scalability differs from the more popular conceptualizations, represented, 
for example, by Weinstock and Goodenough (2006). The differences are that Weinstock and 
Goodenough (2006) mainly focus on (1) First, relational scale concerns such as number of 
users or user driven performance metric, whereas space and time cannot be ignored; (2) 
Second, they focus almost entirely on the ability to scale up. Effortless scaling down is equally 
important, particularly when previous capacity becomes obsolete and needs to be removed. 
Thus it is not just important to meet increasing incremental demand but to know what to do 
if the demand disappears.  
vii Actual outturn costs (also called actual CAPEX) are defined as real, accounted construction 
costs determined at the time of project completion. Estimated costs are defined as budgeted, 
or forecasted, construction costs at the time of decision to build. The actual outturn costs 
comprise the following elements: right-of-way acquisition and resettlement; design 
engineering and project management services; construction of all civil works and facilities 
related to completing a dam project; equipment purchases. 
Cost underrun or overrun is the actual outturn costs expressed as a ratio of estimated costs.  
The year of the date of the decision to build a project is the base year of prices in which all 
estimated and actual constant costs have been expressed in real (i.e. with the effects of 
inflation removed) local currency terms of the country in which the project is located. Cost 
overruns can also be expressed as the actual outturn costs minus estimated costs in percent of 
estimated costs. 
viii Actual implementation schedule of the project in months. The implementation start date 
(also known as the final decision to build) is the date of project approval by the main 
financiers and the key decision makers. The implementation completion date is the date of 
full commercial operation. Schedule slippage or schedule underrun or overrun is the actual 
implementation months express as a ratio of the estimated implementation schedule.  
ix According to the New York Times (22 July 1985), The Montecatini Company had built the 
mine and Stava dam complex in the early 1960's. It was taken over by the Italian state energy 
company, Enil, in 1979 and sold to Prealpi in 1981. Disaster struck in 1985.   
x Discussion of the Kariba case here benefited from personal communication with Jacques 
Leslie.  
xi As part of its cumulative fragility, it is worth noting Kariba dam’s large and continuing 
negative social and environmental impacts, which were poorly mitigated. Thayer Scudder 
(2005, p. 1) writes, initially “considered a successful project even by affected people based on 
cost benefit analysis, Kariba also involved unacceptable environmental and social impacts. 
The involuntary resettlement of 57,000 people within the reservoir basin and immediately 
downstream from the dam was responsible for serious environmental degradation which was 
one of a number of factors that left a majority of those resettled impoverished.” Moreover, as 
an important aside, the Phase 2 of the Kariba built 1970-1977, constituting a 600 MW 
powerhouse, suffered a cost overrun 2.5 times its estimate badly damaging the overall 
program’s BCR (see World Ban, 1983; WCD, 2000b, pp. 12-14).  
 
